Institutional Investors’ Ownership Stability and Their Investee Firms’ Equity Mispricing by Sakaki, Hamid et al.
University of Texas Rio Grande Valley 
ScholarWorks @ UTRGV 
Economics and Finance Faculty Publications 
and Presentations 
Robert C. Vackar College of Business & 
Entrepreneurship 
6-2021 
Institutional Investors’ Ownership Stability and Their Investee 




The University of Texas Rio Grande Valley 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.utrgv.edu/ef_fac 
 Part of the Finance Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Sakaki, H., Jory, S., Jackson, D., 2021. Institutional investors’ ownership stability and their investee firms’ 
equity mispricing. The North American Journal of Economics and Finance 57, 101440. https://doi.org/
10.1016/j.najef.2021.101440 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Robert C. Vackar College of Business & 
Entrepreneurship at ScholarWorks @ UTRGV. It has been accepted for inclusion in Economics and Finance Faculty 
Publications and Presentations by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ UTRGV. For more information, 




Equities are said to be “mispriced” when deviations exist between a firm’s stock price 
and its intrinsic value (the intrinsic value is defined as the present value of the future cash flows 
generated by the firm on a per share basis). The adverse consequences of equity mispricing for 
investors and corporations are well documented in the literature (Chirinko and Schaller, 2001; 
Baker et al., 2003; Shleifer and Vishny, 2003; Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, 2004; Rhodes-
Kropf et al., 2005; Polk and Sapienza, 2009; and, Campello and Graham, 2013). 
The causes of equity mispricing are diverse and include investor sentiment (Baker and 
Wurgler, 2006) and investors' behavioral biases (Barberis et al., 1998; and, Daniel et al., 1998), 
among others. This study adds to the literature by considering how institutional investors invest 
on the basis of firm mispricing. Institutional investors are the dominant group of investors having 
raised their ownership of US-listed corporations from 7-8% in 1950 to about 67% by 2010 
(Blume and Keim, 2012), and it is essential to assess how their growing influence is contributing 
to equity pricing. Several dimensions of institutional investors are examined in this paper, 
including their equity ownership proportion and stability, as well as their investment horizon. 
Institutional investors can influence their investee firms via two channels. The first 
channel is through direct monitoring following acquisitions of large blocks of shares. Indirect 
monitoring is the second channel. In this case, institutional investors can punish or reward firms 
by their trading behavior (Parrino et al., 2003) ― selling a firm’s stock puts downward pressure 
on the stock price, and thus disciplines management through loss of firm value. As a result, we 
would expect a direct link between institutional ownership and the actions taken at their investee 
firms, which would reflect on the firm's equity pricing. 
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Bushee (1998, 2001) and Bushee and Noe (2000) classify institutional investors into the 
following groups, i.e., dedicated, transient, and quasi-indexers investors. “Dedicated” 
institutional investors tend to adopt a long-term investment horizon by holding large, stable 
holdings in a relatively small number of firms. Conversely, “Transient” investors trade 
aggressively (i.e., their equity portfolios exhibit high levels of turnover), their portfolios are more 
diversified, and they are focused on short-term returns. “Quasi-indexer” institutions hold large, 
diversified portfolios and trade very infrequently; they tend to be passive investors pursuing 
primarily a buy-and-hold investment strategy. Given their different investment strategies, we 
examine the extent of equity mispricing in their portfolios. For example, if dedicated institutional 
investors favor a relationship approach to investing, we test whether they are associated with less 
mispriced stocks. Since transient investors are actively seeking short-term returns, we test 
whether they are associated with more mispriced stocks. 
We use two methods to assess equity mispricing. The first one follows Rhodes-Kropf et 
al. (2005), a widely used method in the literature on equity mispricing (for instance, Lin et al. 
2010; Bonaimé et al., 2014). Under this model, mispricing (denoted by EXVRK) represents the 
difference between a firm’s market and fundamental values. The second method to compute 
equity mispricing, i.e., EXVIA, i.e., the natural log of the ratio between a firm’s capital and its 
imputed value. The sample includes all U.S. publicly listed firms held by institutional investors 
from 1981 to 2012. There are 82,037 firm-year observations based on 11,461 firms. Our analysis 
reveals several interesting findings. First, the higher the proportion of equity ownership by 
institutional investors in a firm, the lower the extent of equity mispricing. Second, volatility in 
institutional equity ownership is positively related to investee firm's measures of equity 
mispricing. Third, institutional ownership by dedicated and quasi-indexers are inversely 
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associated with investee firm's measures of mispricing. Lastly, ownership by transient 
institutional investors is associated with higher investee firm's equity mispricing.  
We make several contributions to the literature. First, we contribute to the factors that 
explain equity mispricing. Second, we augment the literature on the effects of institutional 
ownership by considering both the volatility in their shareholdings and the variability in the types 
of institutional investors. Third, we contribute to the stock market efficiency literature by 
documenting the linkage between equity mispricing and institutional ownership stability.  
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to document the effects of institutional 
ownership stability on equity mispricing. Our study contributes to understanding the forces of 
institutional ownership on equity mispricing and renders the stock market more efficient. We 
posit our study as an extension to Lin et al. (2010) in the sense that the actions and involvement 
of institutional investors help to bridge the gap between artificial and true values of equity. The 
benefits to institutional investors are that by contributing to making stock prices more accurate, 
they preclude themselves from being caught by a bubble. Many institutional investors manage 
others' money and therefore are tasked to invest their investors' money responsibly and 
prudently. 
 The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: The following section presents a 
brief review of the related literature. Data and methods are presented in Sections 3 and 4, 
respectively. Results are presented and discussed in Section 5; and, the final section concludes 
the paper. 
 
2.  Literature Review  
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 Studies that consider the effects of institutional ownership on equity mispricing (for 
example, Sias and Starks (1997) on the price adjustment process; Bartov et al. (2000) on 
mispricing following earnings announcement; Collins et al. (2003) on mispricing and accruals) 
focus primarily on the proportion of the share ownership by institutional investors rather than the 
stability and persistence of institutional investors’ equity ownership.  
Certain studies document the superior trading ability of institutional investors relative to 
individual investors and their contributions to stock pricing efficiency. Cohen et al. (2002) 
compare and contrast institutional investors’ trades (in response to cash flow-related news) 
relative to those of private individuals. They find that institutions buy (sell) shares from (to) 
individual investors following positive (negative) cash flow news. Conversely, share price 
increases (decreases) that are not accompanied by positive (negative) cash flow news prompt 
institutional investors to sell (buy) the shares to (from) the individuals. Institutional investors 
trade stocks with individuals rather than among themselves since, as a class of investors, they 
share the same information; and their actions cause a stock price to align more closely to its 
intrinsic value. 
Barber and Odean (2008) compares and contrasts the investment patterns of institutional 
investors relative to individual investors. Their findings suggest that the trading behaviors of the 
two differ and institutional investors, on average, hold more substantial ownership than 
individual investors, and they are more sophisticated in acquiring and processing investment-
related information. The authors find that individuals display attention-based buying behavior 
when stocks are in the news, while institutional investors do not exhibit such behavior. 
Individual investors’ propensity to trade on attention-grabbing news leads to higher volatility in 
stock prices. Conversely, institutional investors trade less on such news, and therefore their 
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trading pattern counteracts the volatility induced by the individual investors’ trades. This 
conjecture is backed up by Boehmer and Kelley (2009), who show that stocks with higher 
institutional ownership are priced more efficiently. 
Prior literature demonstrates that the presence of institutional investors plays a significant 
role in the overall future pricing of securities. Gompers and Metrick (2001) assert that there is a 
positive relation between institutional ownership and future stock returns. They find that “large” 
institutional investors doubled their share ownership between 1980 and 1996, and show that their 
involvement accounts for approximately half the increase in the stock price of large firms. They 
define “large” institutional investors as a category including all managers with at least $100 
million under management. Yan and Zhang (2009) later show that the findings in Gompers and 
Metrick (2001) are driven by short-term institutions, i.e., institutions that trade more actively. 
Given these findings, we believe that differentiating between institutional investors based on 
their investment horizons will shed further light on the group’s impact on equity pricing. 
Chakrabarty et al.’s (2017) study of daily institutional trades documents that many such 
trades by short-term institutional investors, in particular, tend to lose money. They find that over 
23% of round-trip trades held for less than three months lose an average of 3.91% in value. The 
negative returns do not appear to be due to loss-cutting based on the arrival of new information. 
Their results suggest that institutional investors that trade often and are characterized by higher 
variability in their shareholdings would be associated with more significant stock mispricing. 
We observe that the findings that institutional investors’ trades push equity prices closer 
to their intrinsic values are based predominantly on treating institutional investors as a 
homogenous class. Accounting for the heterogeneity that exists among institutional investors 
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would cause the findings to differ. Institutional investors tend to vary on various characteristics. 
For a start, there are both long-term and short-term oriented investors. Long-term investors are 
more inclined to work with management to create value through closer monitoring (Chen et al., 
2007).  Short-term investors are less likely to perform such tasks, i.e., engaging with investee 
firm’s management to create wealth in the long run (Yan and Zhang, 2009). Consequently, the 
way institutional investors’ select their equity portfolios differ based on their investment 
objectives and horizons. 
To ascertain the effects of different types of institutional investors on equity mispricing, 
we use the classification of Bushee (1998, 2001) and Bushee and Noe (2000) and group 
institutional investors into either dedicated, transient, or quasi-indexer. Transient investors trade 
aggressively in search of short-term profits. Simultaneously, dedicated and quasi-indexing 
institutions have a longer investment horizon and do not actively transact shares for short-term 
gains. The analysis of the effects of institutional investors on equity mispricing per this 
classification is essential. Ke and Petroni (2004) describe how the actions of transient 
institutional investors' ability to predict a break in a string of consecutive earnings increases can 
improve stock pricing. Cremers and Pareek (2011) find that both momentum returns and 
subsequent returns reversal are stronger for stocks with greater proportions of short-term 
institutional investors. Derrien et al. (2013) find that longer investor horizons attenuate the effect 
of stock mispricing on corporate policies.  
Besides the heterogeneity among institutional investors, another factor affecting firm 
valuation is the volatility in their equity shareholdings. For example, Elyasiani and Jia (2008) 
show that institutional ownership stability positively affects banks’ performance. Elyasiani et al. 
(2010) document that institutional ownership stability leads to lower debt costs. Jafarinejad et al. 
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(2015) find that the presence of long-term stable institutional investors enhances the value of 
diversified firms. Sakaki et al. (2017) show that firms held by more stable institutional investors 
experience lower real activities manipulations. Jory et al. (2017) find a positive association 
between institutional ownership persistence and dividend payout. While the literature on 
institutional ownership stability is still nascent, the evidence so far suggests that the stability of 
institutional shareholdings is an economically important factor in the study of firm valuation. 
This paper extends the literature by studying how institutional invertors’ ownership stability 
affects equity mispricing at investee firms.  
 
3. Data Source and Sample Selection 
Information on institutional ownership is obtained from the Thomson-Reuters 
Institutional Holdings (13F) database (formerly known as CDA spectrum). The shareholdings 
data come from Form 13F filed by institutional managers—with $100 million or more in assets 
under management—with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). We obtained 
annual financial and accounting data to estimate mispricing variables from the Compustat 
Database. To classify institutional investors based on their investment horizon, we obtained data 
on trading frequency from Professor Bushee website1 and trading volume from the University of 
Chicago’s Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database .  
The sample includes all U.S. publicly listed firms held by institutional investors from 
1981 to 2012. There are 82,037 firm-year observations based on 11,461 firms, as shown in panel 
A of Table 1. Panel B of Table 1 presents the sample distribution by industry based on the Fama 
 
1 Available from Brian Bushee’s website, http://acct3.wharton.upenn.edu/faculty/bushee/.  Data accessed on 
12.01.2015.  
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and French 12-sector industry classification. The main industries are: Business Equipment 
(22.24%), Others2 (16.02%), Manufacturing (15.96%), Wholesale, Retail, and Some Services 
(12.78%). The least represented industry is Chemical (2.99%). 
 [INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
4. Methodology 
4.1.Measures of Institutional Investors’ Ownership 
To measure institutional ownership volatility, we follow Elyasiani et al. (2010) and use 
the variable (𝐼𝑂𝑉𝑖), which is the average standard deviation of institutional shareholding 
proportions across all investors j in firm i over a five-year period including the sample year and 
the four years preceding (i.e., 20 quarters).  
𝐼𝑂𝑉𝑖  = Ʃ𝑗=1
𝑗𝑖 Std (𝑝𝑖 ,𝑡
𝑗
) / 𝐽𝑖                                                                                                                (1) 
where 𝑝𝑖 ,𝑡
𝑗
 is the proportion of firm i held by investor j in quarter t (t = 1, 2,…, 20), and 𝐽𝑖  is the 
number of institutional owners in firm i. The higher the ownership volatility, the lower is the 
institutional ownership stability and vice versa. Therefore, lower IOV is associated with higher 
institutional ownership stability. 
To control for the effect of institutional ownership on equity mispricing, we consider the 
aggregate ownership proportion (following Elyasiani et al., 2010), which is computed over a 
five-year period (i.e., 20 quarters) as follows: 




) / 20                                                                                                         (2) 
 
2 Mines, Construction, Building Maintenance, Transportation, Hotels, Bus Services, Entertainment  





 is the proportion of firm i held by investor j in quarter t (t = 1, 2,…, 20). 
4.2.Measures of Equity Mispricing 
Two methods are used to compute equity mispricing. The first one follows Rhodes-Kropf 
et al. (2005), a method that is widely used in the literature on equity mispricing (for instance, Lin 
et al. 2010; Bonaimé et al., 2014). Under this model, mispricing (denoted by EXVRK) represents 
the difference between a firm’s market and fundamental values. The fundamental value is 
obtained by estimating equation (3) for every industry and every year as follows: 
ln (𝑀𝑉𝑖𝑡) = 𝛽0𝑗𝑡  + 𝛽1𝑗𝑡  ln (𝐵𝑉𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽2𝑗𝑡  ln [abs (𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡)] + 𝛽3𝑗𝑡  𝐼(<0) ln [abs (𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡)] + 𝛽4𝑗𝑡 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡  + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                                                 
(3) 
where 𝑀𝑉𝑖𝑡 is the market value of equity; 𝐵𝑉𝑖𝑡  is the book value of equity; 𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡 is net income; 
𝐼(<0) is an indicator variable that equals one if the firm reports a net loss and zero otherwise; and 
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡  is the firm leverage; abs represents absolute values and ln represents the natural logarithm. 
All variables are measured at the end of the fiscal year. We estimate this regression for each year 
and industry3 and we use the residuals (𝜀𝑖𝑡) from these regressions as the first proxy for 
measuring equity mispricing (EXVRK).  
The second method to compute equity mispricing , EXVIA (Lin et al. 2010), is the 
natural log of the ratio between a firm’s capital and its imputed value , and it is computed as 
follows: 
𝐸𝑋𝑉𝐼𝐴𝑖𝑡  = ln [
𝐶𝑃𝑇𝐿𝑖𝑡
𝐼𝐶𝑃𝑇𝐿𝑖𝑡 
],                                                                                                                     (4) 
 
3 Industry is defined based on the Fama and French 12-sector industry classification. 
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where 𝐶𝑃𝑇𝐿𝑖𝑡 is total capital, measured as the market value of equity plus book value of debt, 
and 𝐼𝐶𝑃𝑇𝐿𝑖𝑡 is the imputed value derived as the product of firm size (market value of common 
equity) and the median capital-to-size ratio in the firm’s industry.4 
4.3.Regression Analysis 
We run the following ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to examine the impact of 
institutional ownership volatility (IOV) on equity mispricing (EXVRK and EXVIA in separate 
regressions): 
𝐸𝑋𝑉𝑅𝐾𝑖,𝑡+1 (𝐸𝑋𝑉𝐼𝐴𝑖,𝑡+1) = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑂𝑉𝑖 ,𝑡  + 𝛽2𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑁_𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛽4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖 ,𝑡 + 
𝛽5𝐿𝑁_𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛽7𝐷𝑌𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑡  + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                              (5) 
where i and t indicate firm and year, respectively. EXVRK and EXVIA are two different proxies 
for equity mispricing as explained in equations (3) and (4), respectively. Our main independent 
variables of interest are: IOV, i.e., the average standard deviation of shareholding proportions 
across all institutional owners, and PROP, i.e., the aggregate institutional shareholding 
proportions. To account for other factors affecting equity mispricing, equation (5) includes the 
following control variables: firm size (𝐿𝑁_𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑡). Following Sheikh (2012) firm size is 
measured as the natural logarithm of total sales. Leverage (𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑡) is the ratio of book value of 
debt (i.e., the sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities) to total assets. Firm age 
(𝐿𝑁_𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡) is the natural logarithm of one plus the number of years the firm is listed on 
Compustat. Profitability (𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡) is the ratio of operating income before depreciation-to-total 
assets. Dividend yield (𝐷𝑌𝑡) is computed as the ratio of dividend to the firm’s market value. All 
variables are measured at the end of year t. YEAR and INDUSTRY are dummy variables to 
 
4 Industry is defined based on the Fama and French 48-sector industry classification. 
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control for the effect of unobserved economic variables and industry-specific effects, 
respectively. The standard errors are clustered by firms.  
 
5. Results 
5.1.Descriptive Statistics of Sample and Correlations 
Table 2 provides the sample descriptive statistics. Panel A of Table 2 contains statistics 
on the mispricing variables. The mean values of EXVRK and EXVIA are 0.518 and 0.329, 
respectively. Our computed values are comparable to the values reported in Lin et. al, 2010 (i.e., 
0.24 and 0.33, respectively).  Panel B presents statistics on the institutional ownership variables. 
The mean value of institutional ownership proportion (PROP) is 23.6%, while the mean values 
of institutional ownership volatility (IOV) is 0.7%. The mean values of the equity ownership of 
Dedicated (DED), Quasi-indexers (QIX), and Transient (TRA) institutional investors are 4.8%, 
22.1% and 8.6%, respectively. The descriptive statistics of the control variables used in the 
multiple regressions are presented in Panel C. There is significant variation among the sample 
firms in terms of sales (LN_SALE), leverage (LEV), return on assets (ROA), age of the firm 
(LN_AGE), and dividend yield (DY). Their inclusion assists in controlling for their influences 
on mispricing.  
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 3 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients between pairs of variables. We 
observe a significant negative correlation between institutional ownership proportions (PROP) 
and the mispricing variables (EXVRK and EXVIA). The negative correlations of -0.0718 and -
0.0616 between PROP and each of EXVRK and EXVIA, respectively, suggest that higher 
institutional ownership proportion (PROP) is linked with lower equity mispricing. Consistent 
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with the beneficial role of institutional investors’ stable presence at firms, the relationship 
between institutional ownership volatility (IOV) and the mispricing variables (EXVRK (0.0236) 
and EXVIA (0.0694)) is significantly positive. This outcome suggests that higher institutional 
ownership volatility (IOV) is associated with increased equity mispricing. We also find a 
significant positive correlation between the two proxies of mispricing , i.e. EXVRK and EXVIA 
(the correlation coefficient is 0.2859).  
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
5.2.Univariate Analysis 
Table 4 reports the mean and median of the mispricing variables (i.e., EXVRK and 
EXVIA) by quartiles of the institutional ownership variables (IOV in Panel A and PROP in Panel 
B). We conduct both a t-test and Wilcoxon test to investigate whether there are significant 
differences in the mispricing variables between the quartiles with high and low institutional 
ownership variables. 
Panel A of Table 4 shows the mean and median mispricing for firms with the lowest (Q1) 
and highest (Q4) level of IOV. Firms with the highest institutional ownership volatility (IOV in 
Quartile 4) exhibit greater mispricing than firms in the bottom quartile (i.e., Quartile 1). The 
differences in the mean and median values of IOV between the bottom and top quartiles are 
negative and statistically significant at the 1% level which further validates our earlier findings. 
Panel B of Table 4 shows the mean and median mispricing for firms with the lowest (Q1) 
and highest (Q4) levels of PROP, which represents the proportion of equity held by institutional 
investors. Firms with the highest level of PROP (i.e., Quartile 4) exhibit less mispricing than 
firms in Quartile 1 with the lowest values of PROP. The differences in the mean and median 
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values of the mispricing variables between the bottom and top quartiles are negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. Thus, Table 4 findings suggest that high institutional 
ownership (i.e., PROP) and low volatility in their shareholdings (proxied by IOV) are associated 
with less mispricing (i.e., EXVRK and EXVIA). 
 [INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
To disentangle the effects of institutional ownership from the volatility in institutional 
shareholdings, we partition the sample into five quintiles using PROP (i.e., the variable 
measuring institutional ownership proportion). Each quintile is then broken down into five sub-
quintiles based on ownership volatility (i.e., IOV). Thus, we end up with a 5×5 matrix. We 
calculate the mean values of EXVRK and EXVIA for each element of the matrix and present the 
findings in Table 5, Panels A and B respectively.  
In panel A of Table 5, as we move vertically from top to bottom, the institutional 
ownership proportion is constant but the institutional ownership volatility increases (higher IOV 
means lower institutional ownership stability). The portfolio with the highest IOV has higher 
equity mispricing (measured by EXVRK) than the portfolio with the lowest value. T-tests 
reported in the last column indicate that this difference is statistically significant. Furthermore, as 
we move horizontally from left to right, the institutional ownership volatility remains unchanged 
but the aggregate proportion increases. As ownership proportion increases, the mean values of 
the equity mispricing variables decrease. Panel B uses EXVIA as the mispricing variables and the 
findings are essentially the same, i.e., higher IOVs are associated with higher mispricing and 
lower PROPs are associated with higher mispricing. 
 [INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
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Overall, the univariate results suggest that there is a negative and significant association 
between institutional ownership stability and equity mispricing. Indeed, even when the 
institutional ownership proportion is fixed, higher institutional ownership stability is associated 
with lower equity mispricing and vice versa. Furthermore, we document a negative and 
significant relationship between institutional ownership proportion and equity mispricing. Our 
findings also suggest that the presence of institutional investors and those that trade their stocks 
less frequently are linked with stocks that exhibit less mispricing. The following sections test 
these associations in a multivariate setup. 
5.3.Institutional Ownership Volatility Results 
Table 6 reports OLS regression results from regressing the equity mispricing variables of 
EXVRK and EXVIA on institutional ownership volatility (IOV) and ownership proportion 
(PROP) alongside control variables. The results of regression models (1) and (2) show that the 
coefficient of institutional ownership volatility (IOV) is positive and statistically significant at the 
1% level with EXVRK in Model 1 and EXVIA in Model 2. Consistently, higher institutional 
ownership volatility (which equates to lower stability in institutional stock ownership) is 
associated with higher equity mispricing. Conversely, there is a negative and significant 
association between institutional ownership proportion (PROP) and both equity mispricing 
variables of EXVRK and EXVIA. Thus, lower equity mispricing is associated with higher 
institutional ownership. 
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 7 reports the results of  firm fixed-effect regressions, which capture the impact of 
time-invariant omitted firm specifications. Consistent with the OLS results from Table 6, IOV 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3138728
15 
 
and PROP are positively and negatively related to the mispricing variables, respectively . Overall, 
the regression results are consistent with the hypothesis that stability in institutional ownership 
and low institutional ownership are positively associated with investee firm’s equity mispricing. 
[INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
5.4.Institutional Investors’ Horizon Results 
As discussed earlier, institutional investors as a group are quite heterogeneous and, 
therefore, this section examines how different types of institutional investors impact investee 
firms’ equity mispricing since their motivations to trade shares differ. To capture the 
heterogeneity amongst institutional investors, we adopt Bushee (1998, 2001) and Bushee and 
Noe (2000) categorization. Specifically, we classify institutional investors into three groups 
based on their investment horizon as follows: Dedicated, Quasi-indexers, and Transient, and 
consider their relationship to equity mispricing separately.  
We hypothesize that since the investment horizons of dedicated and quasi-indexers 
investors tend to be long-term, they will be associated with less mispriced stocks. Conversely, 
the short-term nature of transient institutional investors would do little to alleviate the investee 
firm’s mispricing. We augment equation (5) by adding the following three independent 
variables: DED, QIX, and TRA; which represent the proportion of the investee firms held by 
Dedicated, Quasi-indexers, and Transient institutional investors, respectively. We present the 
results of the OLS regressions in Table 8 and those of the fixed-effect regressions in Table 9.  
Consistent with our hypothesis, the proportion of shares held by DED and QIX is 
inversely related to EXVRK and EXVIA, i.e., the more shares held by these investors, the lower is 
the mispricing in the equity of the investee firms. To validate the effects of investment horizon 
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on equity mispricing, the coefficient of TRA is positively related to both EXVRK and EXVIA, i.e., 
short-term institutional investors are associated with more mispriced stocks. Accounting for 
fixed effects, the results stay qualitatively the same in Table 9. 
[INSERT TABLES 8 & 9 ABOUT HERE] 
The findings from Tables 8 and Table 9 are consistent with the hypothesis that the 
strength of the relationship between institutional investors and equity mispricing depends on the 
characteristics of institutional investors. That is, the equity of firms held by Dedicated and Quasi-
indexers institutional investors (long-term) is less mispriced than the equity held by Transient 
investors (short-term). 
5.5.Three-stage least squares regression  
To account for potential endogeneity concerns, we run simultaneous-equation regressions 
of equity mispricing and institutional ownership using the technique of three-stage least-squares 
(3SLS) method following Elyasiani et al. (2010) and Sakaki & Jory (2019) at the firm-level. The 
control variables for IOV are firm size (LN_SALE), shares outstanding (LN_SHARES), and 
trading volume (TURNOVER). To explore the direction of the effect between institutional 
ownership stability and equity mispricing, we use their lead values by one year when they are 
used as outcome variables.  Table 10 reports the results of our 3SLS estimations.  
In the EXVRK regression results, the coefficient estimates of IOV reported in column (1) 
of Table 10 is positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level, suggesting that 
institutional ownership volatility leads to higher equity mispricing. The coefficient estimates of 
the EXVRK reported in column (2) is not statistically significant, suggesting that equity mispricing 
may not be a consideration for institutional ownership to continue their stock holding with the 
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firms. When we use EXVIA as our alternative dependent variable, we document similar results as 
reported in columns (3) and (4). Put it differently, it is not the mispriced stocks that attracts the 
institutional investors and encourages them to continue their ownership, rather institutional 
ownership stability influences equity mispricing.  
[INSERT TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE] 
 
5.6.Alternative measure of mispricing and decade wise regressions 
Table 11 presents the findings of the fixed-effect regressions based on alternative measures 
of equity mispricing using the residual income model (Ohlson, 1995). The dependent variable is 
EXVRI which is the absolute value of the natural log of the ratio between the stock price and its 
intrinsic value from Ohlson’s (1995) residual income value approach. EXVRI = Ln[Price / I(V)], 
where Price is the stock price at the end of June of each year from CRSP, and I(V) is intrinsic 
value using the residual income model (Ohlson, 1995) and median values of analysts’ forecasts 
issued in June, as in Frankel and Lee (1998).   
[INSERT TABLE 11 ABOUT HERE] 
The findings stay the same as before, i.e., IOV is positively and significantly related to 
mispricing while PROP is negatively and statistically associated with mispricing. The equity 
shareholdings of dedicated (DED) and quasi-indexers (QIS) are inversely associated with 
mispricing, while those of transient institutional investors (TRA) are positively related to 
mispricing. Thus, stability in institutional ownership, the proportion of shares held by 
institutional investors, and institutional investors that exhibit a long-term focus on investments at 
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their investor firms individually contribute to rendering the investor firm's equity more correctly 
priced. 
We break the sample by decades and present our findings in Table 12. The findings on 
PROP representing the proportion of the firm equity held by institutional investors are more 
stable across time. The coefficient of PROP in the regressions of equity mispricing of EXVRK is 
negative and statistically significant in Panels A and D of Table 12. 
[INSERT TABLE 12 ABOUT HERE] 
6. Conclusion 
We study the association between institutional ownership and the stability of their equity 
ownership to determine if and to what extent these characteristics impact the extent to which the 
equity of their investee firms is mispriced. This investigation is important in understanding 
equity mispricing because institutional investors have been shown to be a heterogenous group, 
i.e., they have differing investment horizons and the extent to which they seek to influence firm 
performance differs.  Our findings suggest that the stability and proportion of institutional 
investors’ equity ownership are significantly related to equity mispricing at investee firms. 
Specifically, the higher the proportion of shares held by institutional investors and the more 
stable is their shareholdings (i.e., the lower the volatility in their shareholdings), the less 
mispriced is the stock. Additionally, the association depends on institutional investors’ 
investment objectives, characteristics, and investment horizons. For instance, while the shares 
held by long-term oriented institutional investors (i.e., dedicated investors and quasi-indexers) 
are less mispriced, those held by short-term institutional investors (i.e., transient investors) are 
more mispriced.  
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Table 1: Sample 
distribution        
Panel A. Sample distribution by year       
Year N % CUM   Year N % CUM 
1981 1,467 1.79 1.79  1998 3,398 4.14 50.69 
1982 1,475 1.8 3.59  1999 3,129 3.81 54.5 
1983 1,722 2.1 5.69  2000 3,142 3.83 58.33 
1984 1,848 2.25 7.94  2001 3,095 3.77 62.11 
1985 1,840 2.24 10.18  2002 3,047 3.71 65.82 
1986 1,982 2.42 12.6  2003 2,941 3.58 69.41 
1987 2,117 2.58 15.18  2004 2,838 3.46 72.87 
1988 2,186 2.66 17.84  2005 3,020 3.68 76.55 
1989 2,057 2.51 20.35  2006 3,042 3.71 80.26 
1990 2,124 2.59 22.94  2007 3,010 3.67 83.92 
1991 2,154 2.63 25.56  2008 2,940 3.58 87.51 
1992 2,340 2.85 28.42  2009 2,791 3.4 90.91 
1993 2,514 3.06 31.48  2010 2,794 3.41 94.32 
1994 2,796 3.41 34.89  2011 2,782 3.39 97.71 
1995 2,931 3.57 38.46  2012 1,881 2.29 100 
1996 3,255 3.97 42.43      
1997 3,379 4.12 46.55   Total 82,037 100   
         
Panel B: Sample distribution by Fama and French 12-sector industry classification  
Industry           N % CUM 
Business Equipment    18,247 22.24 22.24 
Manufacturing    13,092 15.96 38.20 
Wholesale, Retail, and Some 
Services    10,483 12.78 50.98 
Healthcare, Medical 
Equipment, and Drugs    8,864 10.80 61.78 
Consumer Non-durables    5,911 7.21 68.99 
Energy    4,399 5.36 74.35 
Consumer durables    2,899 3.53 77.88 
Telephone and Television 
Transmission    2,540 3.10 80.98 
Chemicals    2,449 2.99 83.97 
Others       13,153 16.03 100 
Total           82,037 100   
 
This table provides a description of the sample. Panel A presents sample distribution by year. Panel B presents the 
sample distribution by industry based on the Fama and French 12-sector industry classification. N represents the 
number of firm-year observations. 
Table 2 - Descriptive statistics of the 
sample      
Panel A. Mispricing variables       
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Variable N 25% Median Mean 75% Std.Dev. Min Max 
EXVRK 82,037 0.182 0.391 0.518 0.711 0.468 0.000 7.447 
EXVIA 82,037 0.096 0.211 0.329 0.410 0.391 0.000 9.071 
         
Panel B. Institutional ownership variables      
Variable N 25% Median Mean 75% Std.Dev. Min Max 
DED (%) 82,037 0.000 0.017 0.048 0.070 0.073 0.000 0.989 
IOV (%) 82,037 0.002 0.005 0.007 0.009 0.009 0.000 0.458 
PROP (%) 82,037 0.060 0.164 0.236 0.360 0.219 0.000 0.999 
QIX (%) 82,037 0.056 0.160 0.221 0.347 0.198 0.000 0.998 
TRA (%) 82,037 0.008 0.048 0.086 0.131 0.100 0.000 0.957 
         
Panel C. Control variables       
Variable N 25% Median Mean 75% Std.Dev. Min Max 
LN_SALE 82,037 3.870 5.221 5.279 6.708 2.210 -6.908 13.054 
LEV 82,037 0.294 0.470 0.485 0.630 0.387 0.003 74.934 
ROA 82,037 0.053 0.119 0.077 0.177 0.538 -134.238 1.984 
LN_AGE 82,037 1.792 2.485 2.374 2.996 0.794 0.693 3.807 
DY 82,037 0.000 0.000 0.013 0.014 0.072 -0.011 12.799 
 
This table shows descriptive statistics of the sample. EXVRK is the absolute value of the firm-specific mispricing 
component of the difference between market value and fundamental value based on model III of Rhodes–Kropf et al. 
(2005).  EXVIA is the absolute figure of the excess value computed as the natural log of the ratio between a firm’s 
capital and its imputed value. PROP is the average aggregate institutional shareholding proportion across a five-year 
period. IOV is calculated as the average standard deviation of shareholding proportions across all the institutional 
owners over a five-year period. DED, QIX and TRA represent the proportion of the investee firms that are held by 
dedicated, quasi-indexers and transient institutional investors, respectively. LN_SALE is measured as the natural 
logarithm of total sales. LEV is measured as book value of debt (sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities) 
divided by total assets. ROA is defined as operating income before depreciation divided by total assets. LN_AGE is 
measured by the natural logarithm of one plus the number of years the firm is listed on Compustat. DY is computed 
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(2) 0.2859*   1        
(3) -0.0718*  -0.0616* 1       
(4) 0.0236* 0.0694* 0.1328*   1      
(5) -0.1461*  -0.2536* 0.5566*  -0.1481* 1     
(6) 0.1062* 0.2958*  0.0394* 0.0055 0.1669* 1 
(7) -0.0841* -0.0143* 0.0578*  -0.0150* 0.1998* -0.2227*   1 
  
(8) -0.1201* 0.0170* 0.2573*  -0.0858* 0.4019* 0.0681* 0.0794*   1 
 
(9)  0.0071* 0.0499* 0.0042 -0.0108* 0.0643* 0.0351*  0.0180*  0.0499* 1 
 
This table reports the correlations among variables used in this study. The column headings are defined as follows: 
(1) EXVRK is the absolute value of the firm-specific mispricing component of the difference between market value and 
fundamental value based on model III of Rhodes–Kropf et al. (2005) 
(2) EXVIA is the absolute figure of the excess value computed as the natural log of the ratio between a firm’s capital and its 
imputed value 
(3) PROP is the average aggregate institutional shareholding proportion across a five-year period 
(4) IOV is calculated as the average standard deviation of shareholding proportions across all the institutional owners over a five -
year period 
(5) LN_SALE is the natural logarithm of total sales 
(6) LEV is the book value of debt (sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities) divided by total assets 
(7) ROA is operating income before depreciation divided by total assets 
(8) LN_AGE is measured by the natural logarithm of one plus the number of years the firm is listed on Compustat 
(9) DY is the ratio of total dividend divided by the firm’s market value 
 
* represents statistical significance at the 10% level 
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Table 4:  Mispricing and Institutional Ownership         
             
Panel A: Mispricing by IOV           
             
  Q1 (Low IOV) Q2 Q3 Q4 (High IOV)         
Variable Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Diff   Median Diff  t-test w-test 
EXVRK 0.524 0.386 0.508 0.380 0.509 0.391 0.535 0.414 -0.011 -0.028 -2.25** -5.84*** 
EXVIA 0.310 0.210 0.304 0.204 0.321 0.204 0.385 0.232 -0.074 -0.021 -18.37*** -10.81*** 
             
Panel B: Mispricing by PROP          
             
  Q1 (Low PROP) Q2 Q3 Q4 (High PROP)         
Variable Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Diff  Median Diff  t-test w-test 
EXVRK 0.579 0.440 0.521 0.397 0.503 0.385 0.474 0.356 -0.105 0.223 22.52***  18.37*** 
EXVIA 0.369 0.238 0.341 0.218 0.312 0.196 0.299 0.196 -0.070 0.173  18.26*** 21.02*** 
 
Table 4 reports the mean and median of the mispricing variables (i.e., EXVRK and EXVIA) by quartiles of the institutional own ership variables (IOV in Panel A 
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Table 5:  EXVRK and EXVIA Sorted by Institutional Ownership Proportion and Stability    
Panel A -  EXVRK Sorted by Institutional Ownership Proportion and Stability     
         
  PROP Low       PROP High     
    1 2 3 4 5 H-L T-statistics 
IOV Low  1 0.593 0.493 0.461 0.415 0.393 -0.200 14.65*** 
 2 0.581 0.535 0.502 0.451 0.447 -0.133 11.5*** 
 3 0.571 0.534 0.510 0.494 0.474 -0.097 7.57*** 
 4 0.573 0.536 0.509 0.491 0.487 -0.086 5.79*** 
IOV High 5 0.594 0.571 0.541 0.537 0.512 -0.082 4.56*** 
H-L 0.000 0.078 0.080 0.122 0.119   
T-statistics   0 -6.49*** -6.22*** -9.11*** -8.99***     
         
Panel B -  EXVIA Sorted by Institutional Ownership Proportion and Stability     
         
  PROP Low       PROP High     
    1 2 3 4 5 H-L T-statistics 
IOV Low  1 0.361 0.290 0.246 0.239 0.223 -0.138 13.49*** 
 2 0.374 0.316 0.278 0.257 0.260 -0.114 12.76*** 
 3 0.384 0.345 0.305 0.283 0.278 -0.106 11.23*** 
 4 0.392 0.389 0.324 0.296 0.303 -0.089 7.1*** 
IOV High 5 0.414 0.421 0.391 0.388 0.395 -0.019 1.030 
H-L 0.053 0.131 0.146 0.149 0.172   
 
The sample is partitioned into five quintiles using PROP (i.e., the variable measuring institutional ownership proportion) first. Each quintile is then broken down 
into five sub-quintiles based on ownership volatility (i.e., IOV). The end result is a 5×5 matrix. Each cell represents the corresponding mean value of EXVRK in 
Panel A and EXVIA in Panel B. *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 6: OLS Regressions    
      EXVRK EXVIA 
      (1) (2) 
IOV𝑡   0.947*** 2.977*** 
   (3.68) (7.731) 
PROP𝑡   -0.038** -0.167*** 
   (-2.175) (-10.455) 
LN_SALE𝑡    -0.034*** -0.001 
   (-12.397) (-0.168) 
LEV𝑡   0.120* 0.212** 
   (1.839) (2.099) 
𝐿𝑁_𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡    -0.037*** 0.018*** 
   (-9.073) (4.848) 
ROA𝑡    0.009 0.037** 
   (1.036) (2.060) 
DY𝑡   -0.042* -0.038 
   (-1.894) (-1.411) 
     
     
     
     
     
Year    YES YES 
Industry   YES YES 
No. of obs.   78,115 78,115 
Adj.R2     0.0742 0.148 
 
This table presents the findings of the OLS regressions. The dependent variable in Model 1 is EXVRK and in Model 
2, it is EXVIA. The variables are defined in Table 2. YEAR and INDUSTRY dummy variables are used to control for 
the effect of unobserved economic variables and industry-specific effects, respectively. The standard errors are 
clustered by firms. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 7: Fixed-effect Regressions 
   
      EXVRK EXVIA 
      (1) (2) 
IOV𝑡   0.667*** 1.237*** 
   (4.972) (6.519) 
PROP𝑡   -0.061*** -0.245*** 
   (-3.586) (-21.742) 
LN_SALE𝑡    -0.047*** -0.024*** 
   (-15.434) (-11.737) 
LEV𝑡   0.063*** 0.111*** 
   (11.985) (31.728) 
𝐿𝑁_𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡    -0.023*** 0.053*** 
   (-2.955) (10.300) 
ROA𝑡    0.110*** 0.090*** 
   (10.020) (12.301) 
DY𝑡   -0.029 -0.071*** 
   (-1.337) (-4.918) 
     
     
     
     
     
Year    YES YES 
Industry   YES YES 
No. of obs.   78,115 78,115 
Adj.R2     0.128 0.084 
 
This table presents the findings of the fixed-effect regressions. The dependent variable in Model 1 is EXVRK and in 
Model 2, it is EXVIA. The variables are defined in Table 2. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** represent 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 8: OLS Regressions        
      EXVRK EXVRK EXVRK EXVIA EXVIA EXVIA 
      (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DED𝑡   -0.08 - - -0.09*** - - 
   (-0.243) - - (-2.643) - - 
QIX𝑡   - -0.122*** - - -0.20*** - 
   - (-6.407) - - (-9.147) - 
TRA𝑡    - - 0.098*** - - 0.202*** 
   - - (3.347) - - (7.974) 
LN_SALE𝑡    -0.036*** -0.031*** -0.037*** -0.008** -0.001 -0.006* 
   (-14.468) (-11.027) (-14.231) (-2.431) (-0.297) (-1.775) 
LEV𝑡   0.120* 0.116* 0.121* 0.216** 0.210** 0.214** 
   (1.845) (1.826) (1.845) (2.105) (2.093) (2.102) 
𝐿𝑁_𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡    -0.036*** -0.034*** -0.034*** 0.014*** 0.017*** 0.010*** 
   (-8.970) (-8.434) (-8.525) (3.743) (4.578) (2.807) 
ROA𝑡    0.009 0.008 0.009 0.039** 0.037** 0.039** 
   (1.061) (0.961) (1.042) (2.057) (2.045) (2.045) 
DY𝑡   -0.041* -0.045** -0.038* -0.032 -0.038 -0.037 
   (-1.869) (-2.039) (-1.752) (-1.279) (-1.451) (-1.422) 
         
         
         
         
         
Year    YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry   YES YES YES YES YES YES 
No. of obs.   78,115 78,115 78,115 78,115 78,115 78,115 
Adj.R2     0.0737 0.0753 0.0740 0.140 0.147 0.142 
 
This table presents the findings of the OLS regressions. The dependent variable in Models 1-3 is EXVRK and in 
Models 4-6, it is EXVIA. The variables are defined in Table 2. YEAR and INDUSTRY dummy variables are used to 
control for the effect of unobserved economic variables and industry-specific effects, respectively. The standard errors 
are clustered by firms. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 9: Fixed-effect Regressions       
      EXVRK EXVRK EXVRK EXVIA EXVIA EXVIA 
      (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DED𝑡   -0.080** - - -0.220*** - - 
   (-2.575) - - (-10.704) - - 
QIX𝑡   - -0.079*** - - -0.259*** - 
   - (-5.196) - - (-25.555) - 
TRA𝑡    - - 0.113*** - - 0.252*** 
   - - (4.536) - - (15.263) 
LN_SALE𝑡    -0.049*** -0.046*** -0.052*** -0.033*** -0.021*** -0.030*** 
   (-16.516) (-14.908) (-17.304) (-16.603) (-10.514) (-15.259) 
LEV𝑡   0.064*** 0.062*** 0.065*** 0.115*** 0.108*** 0.115*** 
   (12.177) (11.780) (12.327) (32.726) (30.931) (32.756) 
𝐿𝑁_𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑡    -0.020** -0.021*** -0.018** 0.071*** 0.067*** 0.068*** 
   (-2.545) (-2.674) (-2.284) (13.862) (13.236) (13.365) 
ROA𝑡    0.113*** 0.110*** 0.111*** 0.098*** 0.087*** 0.105*** 
   (10.248) (9.933) (10.072) (13.406) (11.938) (14.379) 
DY𝑡   -0.029 -0.029 -0.028 -0.069*** -0.071*** -0.071*** 
   (-1.323) (-1.348) (-1.285) (-4.779) (-4.922) (-4.889) 
         
         
         
         
         
Year    YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry   YES YES YES YES YES YES 
No. of obs.   78,115 78,115 78,115 78,115 78,115 78,115 
Adj.R2     0.129 0.128 0.148 0.072 0.064 0.07 
 
This table presents the findings of the fixed-effect regressions. The dependent variable in Model 1 is EXVRK and in 
Model 2, it is EXVIA. The variables are defined in Table 2. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** represent 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 10 – Three-stage least squared regressions 
 
  EXVRK IOV EXVIA IOV 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
IOV 0.824*** - 0.628*** - 
 (4.832) - (9.715) - 
PROP -0.054** - -0.167*** - 
 (-7.529) - (-12.723) - 
EXVRK - -3.297 - - 
 - (-1.323) - - 
EXVIA - - - -2.675 
 - - - (-1.285) 
LN_SALE -0.541** -0.962** -0.622*** -0.873** 
 (-17.524) (-12.37) (-16.824) (-11.168) 
LEV 0.237*** - 0.263** - 
 (3.322) - (2.934) - 
LN_AGE 0.041*** - 0.038*** - 
 (-8.324) - (4.983) - 
ROA 0.032*** - 0.0431*** - 
 (2.764) - (2.765) - 
DY -0.062** - -0.078** - 
 (-3.424) - (-2.114) - 
LN_SHARES - -0.074** - -0.083** 
 - (-32.13) - (-28.517) 
TURNOVER - -0.018** - -0.019** 
 - (-1.932) - (-2.163) 
     
Year  YES YES YES YES 
Industry YES YES YES YES 
No. of obs. 56,335 56,335 56,335 56,335 
Adj.R2 0.276 0.314 0.281 0.361 
 
This table reports the results from the three-stage least squares regressions. The definitions of variables are provided 
in Table 2. Additionally, LN_SHARES is the natural log of the number of shares outstanding of the firm. 
TURNOVER is the average of the daily ratio of trading volume to the total number of shares outstanding. *, ** and 
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 11 – Robustness check 
      
      EXVRI EXVRI EXVRI EXVRI 
      (1) (2) (3) (4) 
IOV   0.193*** - - - 
   (-9.389) - - - 
PROP   -0.254*** - - - 
   (-25.029) - - - 
DED   - -0.197*** - - 
   - (-9.601) - - 
QIX   - - -0.242*** - 
   - - (-23.599) - 
TRA   - - - 0.223*** 
   - - - (-10.861) 
LN_SALE   -0.020*** -0.017*** -0.019*** -0.028*** 
   (-9.791) (-8.485) (-9.235) (-14.212) 
LEV   0.108*** 0.107*** 0.108*** 0.114*** 
   (30.749) (30.704) (30.891) (32.497) 
LN_AGE   0.067*** 0.064*** 0.065*** 0.067*** 
   (13.079) (12.584) (12.752) (13.160) 
ROA   0.086*** 0.091*** 0.092*** 0.104*** 
   (11.778) (12.470) (12.623) (14.162) 
DY   -0.071*** -0.072*** -0.072*** -0.071*** 
   (-4.933) (-5.021) (-5.009) (-4.906) 
       
       
       
       
       
Year    Y Y Y Y 
Industry   Y Y Y Y 
No. of obs.   78,115 78,115 78,115 78,115 
Adj.R2     0.087 0.089 0.088 0.082 
 
This table presents the findings of the fixed-effect regressions. The dependent variable is EXVRI which is the absolute 
value of the natural log of the ratio between the stock price and its intrinsic value from the Ohlson’s (1995) residual 
income value approach. EXVRI = Ln[Price / I(V)], where Price is the stock price at the end of June of each year from 
CRSP, and I(V) is intrinsic value using the residual income model (Ohlson, 1995) and median values of analysts’ 
forecasts issued in June, as in Frankel and Lee (1998).  The variables are defined in Table 2. T-statistics are reported 
in parentheses. *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 12 - Fixed-effect Regressions       
Panel A: 1981-1990     Panel D: 2001-2007  
  EXVRK EXVRK EXVRK EXVRK  EXVRK EXVRK EXVRK EXVRK 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
IOV -0.154 - - -  -0.262 - - - 
 (-0.278) - - -  (-0.444) - - - 
PROP -0.198*** - - -  -0.080* - - - 
 (-2.782) - - -  (-1.771) - - - 
DED - -0.240** - -  - -0.023 - - 
 - (-2.491) - -  - (-0.358) - - 
QIX - - -0.054 -  - - -0.074** - 
 - - (-1.080) -  - - (-2.246) - 
TRA - - - 0.040  - - - 0.098** 
 - - - (0.466)  - - - (2.102) 
Controls Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Year  Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Industry Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
No. of obs. 17,879 17,879 17,879 3,932  4,717 4,717 4,717 4,717 
Adj.R2 0.033 0.033 0.032 0.032  0.055 0.055 0.055 0.055 
          
Panel B: 1991-2000     Panel E: 1981-2007  
  EXVRK EXVRK EXVRK EXVRK  EXVRK EXVRK EXVRK EXVRK 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
IOV 0.329 - - -  -0.616** - - - 
 (0.656) - - -  (-2.092) - - - 
PROP 0.047 - - -  
-
0.085*** - - - 
 (1.005) - - -  (-4.137) - - - 
DED - -0.186*** - -  - 
-
0.143*** - - 
 - (-2.753) - -  - (-3.986) - - 
QIX - - -0.016 -  - - 
-
0.096*** - 
 - - (-0.439) -  - - (-5.455) - 
TRA - - - 0.232***  - - - 0.114*** 
 - - - (4.796)  - - - (4.051) 
Controls Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Year  Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
Industry Y Y Y Y  Y Y Y Y 
No. of obs. 6,117 6,117 6,117 6,117  9,950 9,950 9,950 9,950 
Adj.R2 0.022 0.023 0.022 0.023  0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 
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Panel C: 2001-2012         
  EXVRK EXVRK EXVRK EXVRK      
  (1) (2) (3) (4)      
IOV 0.164 - - -      
 (0.311) - - -      
PROP -0.040 - - -      
 (-1.435) - - -      
DED - 0.031 - -      
 - (0.689) - -      
QIX - - -0.042* -      
 - - (-1.766) -      
TRA - - - 0.099***      
 - - - (2.822)      
Controls Y Y Y Y      
Year  Y Y Y Y      
Industry Y Y Y Y      
No. of obs. 5,690 5,690 5,690 5,690      
Adj.R2 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.037      
 
This table reports the results from the baseline regression under the context of different subsamples. The dependent 
variable is the EXVRK (We also run the regressions with EXVIA and EXVRI as dependent variables. However, the 
results are very similar to the EXVRK. So, we have decided to only report EXVRK estimations). The control variables 
are as same as the one that we have for baseline regressions. So, we have decided to reduce the table and report only 
key variables.  The variables are defined in Table 2. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** represent 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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